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I will send forth My terror before you, and I will throw
into panic all the people among whom you come, and I
will make all your enemies turn tail before you ... I will
drive them out before you little by little, until you have
increased and possessed the land. - Exodus 22:27.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE OMNIPRESENT threat of terrorism' continues to
, For purposes of this article, the term "terrorism" will be defined as terror-
inspiring violence containing an international element that is committed by indi-
viduals or groups against non-combatants, civilians, states, or internationally pro-
tected persons or entities in order to achieve political ends. For a detailed
discussion of the definition of terrorism, see infra notes 185-217 and accompany-
ing text.
The recent and dramatic rise of international terrorism has led some commen-
tators to suggest that the world has "entered an 'age of terrorism', the pattern of
which is unlike any other period in history when ideological and political violence
occurred." Alexander & Finger, Introduction to TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES at xi (Y. Alexander & S. Finger eds. 1977). Indeed, throughout the
20th century, and especially in the period following World War II, "[t]he use of
terrorism as a political weapon has expanded to virtually every geographic and
political area of the world." Comment, International Legal and Policy Implications of
an American Counter-Terrorist Strategy, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121 (1985). Risks
International, a security consulting firm in Alexandria, Virginia, that tracks terror-
ism all over the world for a series of publications that is sent to corporate and
government clients, has reported 25,000 terrorist incidents between 1970 and
1986. Kindel, Catching Terrorists, Sct. Dic., Sept. 1986, at 37. Six thousand inci-
dents, or one-quarter of the 25,000 terrorist attacks reported, occurred within the
two year period between 1984 and 1986. Id. Forty-one terrorist acts alone were
committed by no fewer than fourteen terrorist groups against the people and
property of twenty-one nations in a single six and one-half week period between
September 1 and October 19, 1984. 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2093, Dec. 1984, at
86.
1987] TERRORIST ATTACK LIABILITY 323
menace modern international civil aviation.2 Recently,
the growing wave of international terrorist attacks5 has
2 The Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention], signed in Paris after World
War I, was the first multilateral treaty concerning air law. The Paris Convention
demonstrates an early acceptance of the distinction between military and civil avi-
ation. Article 32 of the Paris Convention, for example, states that "no military
aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another contracting
State nor land thereon without special authorization." Id art. 32. Nevertheless,
each contracting party to the Paris Convention also agreed to allow freedom of
innocent passage above its territory in time of peace to the civilian aircraft of
every other contracting party to the Paris Convention with the exception of air-
craft engaged in scheduled services. Id. arts. 2, 15.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature Dec. 7, 1944;
61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Conven-
tion], which specifically superseded the Paris Convention, see id. art. 80, makes
similar distinctions between military and civil aviation. Article 3(b) of the Chicago
Convention states that "[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services
shall be deemed to be state aircraft." Id art. 3(b). Aircraft belonging to state-
owned airlines would not fall within the "state aircraft" definition. See id.
Although the Chicago Convention did not define the term "international civil avi-
ation," the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council has defined
the comparable term "scheduled international air service" as a series of flights
that: (a) pass through the airspace over the territory of more than one country; (b)
are carried out by aircraft for the transport of passengers, mail or cargo for remu-
neration in such a manner that each flight is open to use by members of the pub-
lic; and (c) are operated, in order to serve traffic between the same two or more
points, either according to a published time-table or with such regularity or fre-
quency that the flights constitute an identifiable systematic series. ICAO Doc.
7278/2, at 3 (1985).
The number of international terrorist incidents continued to grow throughout
1986. In December, 1986, the U.S. State Department announced that 620 inter-
national terrorist acts involving the citizens or territories of more than one coun-
try had been committed in the first nine months of 1986. Terrorists Strike Again, But
Victims Strike Back, Associated Press, Domestic News, Jan. 1, 1987 (available on
NEXIS). This statistic placed 1986 slightly ahead of the pace of international ter-
rorist attacks for 1985, which saw a record total of 800 such incidents for the
entire year. Id. For statistics of terrorist attacks not confined to just those inci-
dents involving the citizens or territories of more than one country, see supra note
I and accompanying text.
Flight International magazine recently reported that terrorism, sabotage or mil-
itary attacks on civilian aircraft caused more than 25% of all air deaths in 1986.
See Terrorism to Blame for 25 Percent of Air Deaths, United Press Int'l, Int'l News, Jan.
26, 1987 (available on NEXIS). Specifically, of the 607 people killed in civilian
airline accidents worlwide in 1986, 219 people were killed in attacks by terrorists,
guerrillas and various military forces. Id. David Learmount, air transport editor
for Flight International magazine, stated that, "The risk of these deliberate disas-
ters today has become apparently as constant a threat as that of human error or
equipment failure." Id
According to Israeli sources, terrorist attacks involving air carriers and airport
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forced air carriers and airport authorities4 to implement
increasingly elaborate and stringent security precautions. 5
authorties worldwide provided the following statistics: (1) In 1985, there were
twenty-eight hijackings and twenty-eight explosions at airports, airline offices and
on aircraft, resulting in 415 fatalities; (2) In 1984, there were thirty hijackings,
eighteen explosions at airports, airline offices and on aircraft, twelve explosive
devices were found and dismantled, and eighteen other criminal acts involving
aviation occurred, resulting in seventy-eight deaths; and (3) In the ten year period
between 1976 and 1986, the average number of hijackings per year worldwide
equaled thirty-two. Ott, ICAO Advances Measures To Combat Terrorism, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct 13, 1986, at 32.
- This article refers to only those carriers and airports that provide interna-
tional flights on a daily basis.
5 In response to the mounting international terrorist threat, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) began implementing new and tighter security meas-
ures for U.S. air carriers in Europe and for a wider group of U.S. airports after the
U.S. strike against terrorist targets in Libya on April 2, 1986. Ott, FAA Tightens
Airport Security to Counter Sabotage Threats, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., April 21, 1986,
at 31 [hereinafter FAA Tightens Airport Security]; see also Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 17, 20 (the author concludes that the
primary goal of the U.S. bombing of Libya on April 2, 1986, was the assassination
of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi). The FAA's escalation of airport
and air carrier security measures to the maximum alert stage precipitated passen-
ger body searches, additional X-ray inspections, the hand-examination of luggage,
the holding of cargo for a minimum period of 24 hours in certain cases and an
increase in armed security guards by U.S. airport authorities and U.S. air carriers.
Ott, FAA Tightens Airport Security, supra, at 31.
In addition, concern over terrorist attacks on international flights led to the
enactment of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, §§ 551-552, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99
Stat.) 190, 222-26 (to be codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). The Act
instructs the Secretary of Transportation to evaluate airport security at interna-
tional air terminals, to recommend corrective measures to foreign governments
for remedying deficiencies, to inform the traveling public of a foreign govern-
ment's deficiencies in implementing those recommendations, and to suspend air
service - by both U.S. carriers to foreign airports with insufficient security pre-
cautions and by the carriers of those deficient nations to U.S. airports - where
security creates impending dangers to travelers. lId
Moreover, after a rise in airline terrorism abroad in 1986, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text, that caused a stunning decline in overseas air traffic, two U.S.
airlines reversed their marketing strategies and began publicizing improved air-
line security precautions. Shift in Airline Strategy on Terrorism: Advertise Security, Asso-
ciated Press, Domestic News, June 17, 1986 (available on NEXIS). In June, 1986,
Pan American World Airways, which flew to more European cities during the sum-
mer of 1986 than any other U.S. airline, announced the "formation of what it
called an elite, highly visible security force to protect passengers and crew." Id
American Airlines, which provided flights to six European destinations in 1986,
also said it was intensifying security procedures by requiring: (1) X-ray screening
or hand inspection of all checked bags; (2) passport information when booking
trans-Atlantic passage; (3) use of a questionnaire about checked bags at all U.S.
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Nevertheless, airlines and airports still may be liable for
damages caused when acts of terrorism injure interna-
tional air travelers.6
The Warsaw Convention of 19297 established the liabil-
ity of air carriers for injuries to their passengers on inter-
national flights8  and "in the course of any of the
cities; and (4) detailed inspections of all airplanes prior to departure. l, Both
American and Pan Am imposed a $5 surcharge per passenger to help cover the
costs of the increased security programs. Id. A TWA spokeswoman said that it
also would add a $5 surcharge but would not publicize its anti-terrorist program.
Id.; see also Greenberg, Hotels, Airlines: The High Cost of Hidden Fees, L.A. Times, Feb.
1, 1987, § 7 (Travel), at 2, col. 1.
On November 4, 1986, at the annual meeting of the 147 member International
Air Transport Association, executives from the world's major airlines condemned
terrorism and urged national governments to help defray the costs of maintaining
security systems to protect civilian aircraft, passengers, and airports. Airlines Urge
Governments To Enforce Anti-Terrorist Measures, Reuters, Ltd. Nov. 4, 1986 (available
on NEXIS). David Coltman, managing director of British Caledonian Airways,
called on countries around the world to finance more of the growing anti-terrorist
security costs faced by airlines and stated: "Acts of terrorism are aimed at govern-
ments, not at airlines." Id. Nations that presently help airlines meet the additional
costs of anti-terrorist security measures, which frequently total hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, include France, the Netherlands and West Germany. Id
o See infra notes 26-299 and accompanying text.
7 The formal title of the Warsaw Convention is the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for
signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in
49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) (adherence of the United States proclaimed Oct. 29,
1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention is a multilat-
eral treaty signed by the United States, and as such, constitutes part of the
supreme law of the land in the U.S., thereby preempting contrary state and local
laws. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35
(1920) (treaties made under United States authority are binding law even within
the territorial limits of a state and may override a state statute); see also Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating that
the Warsaw Convention, being a treaty made by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, is the law of the land in the United States).
H Air carrier liability for injuries sustained on domestic flights falls within the
ordinary rules of negligence unless a statutory rule exists to the contrary. See
Comment, Liability of Air Carriers for Injuries to Passengers Resulting From Domestic
Hijackings and Related Incidents, 46J. AiR L. & CoM. 147 (1981). The Warsaw Con-
vention, however, regulates all flights whose origin and destination are both
within the territory of two signatory nations in accordance with the contract of
carriage. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(2). If both the origin and desti-
nation are within the territory of one signatory nation, the Convention still applies
when there is an agreed-upon stopover within the territory of another nation, irre-
spective of whether the nation is or is not a party to the treaty. Id.
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operations of embarking or disembarking" from a flight.9
Originally, the Convention limited the liability Of air carri-
ers to 125,000 Poincare francs, or approximately
$8,300.10 The actual recovery limit on air carrier liability
differs from country to country, however, depending on
what modification was adopted by the country in which
the appropriate court of review is situated. In countries
that adhere to the Hague Protocol," for example, the lia-
bility limit rises to $16,600.12 In countries that recognize
the Montreal Agreement, 3 the limitation on liability is in-
, Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
so Id. art. 22. Article 22 provides in pertinent part that "[in the transportation
of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the
sum of 125,000 francs." Id. The unit of reference is "to the French franc consist-
ing of 65-1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths." Id. art. 22, para. 4. "These sums may be converted into any na-
tional currency in round figures." Id. Between 1934 and 1972, this amount was
the equivalent of $8,300. See Comment, Aviation: Enforceability of Warsaw Convention
Limits on Liability in the United State, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 24 HARV. INT'L LJ. 183, 185-86 (1983).
This limitation on liability was considered a primary purpose of the Warsaw
Convention. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01 [2] (rev. ed. 1986).
The liability limitation was created to protect the infant airline industry from the
potentially devastating financial burdens of passengers' claims. See In re Air Crash
in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1118-19 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967); Note, A Proposed
Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 57 IND. LJ. 297 (1982).
,1 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371, ICAO Doc. 7686 -LC/140, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAw 955 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The United
States has not ratified this Protocol. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10,
at 504-16.
12 Article 11 of the Hague Protocol amended article 22 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion to provide that "the liability of the carrier for each such passenger is limited
to the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand francs." Hague Protocol, supra note
11, at art. 11. Although the limitation on liability is set forth in the Protocol in
francs, the debate over the limitation was framed in terms of francs or dollars, and
set at 250,000 francs, or $16,600. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at
506-09. The $16,600 liability limitation is absolute in that it contains no provision
for inflation or currency fluctuations.
1- Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by
Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E-23680, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAw 971 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981), explained in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982)
[hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
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creased to $75,000.14 For those countries adhering to the
Guatemala Protocol,15 the liability limit continues to rise
to $100,000.16 The most recent revision of the Warsaw
Convention17 further raises the maximum recovery limit
to approximately $120,00018 and also allows signatory na-
tions to establish supplemental compensation plans that
could increase the liability limitation to $200,000.19
The limitations on air carrier liability provided for by
the Warsaw Convention and its progeny20 do not apply,
however, if "willful misconduct" can be proven on the
part of the air carrier, its agents or employees.2' Critics of
security measures instituted and maintained by air carri-
ers and airport authorities assert that appropriate courts
of review should find "willful misconduct" when adequate
security measures are available but have not been em-
ployed fully to protect airline passengers.22 Proponents
of this view argue that judicial enforcement of the willful
misconduct exception to limited liability for airports and
airlines necessarily will allow for more adequate compen-
sation of injured passengers, and perhaps, also will lead to
1Id. at Ij 1(1). The $75,000 liability limit is expressed in U.S. dollars. See id
is Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, done March 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. No. 8932
(1971), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw 975, 978 (2d ed. Doc. Supp.
1981) [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol]. The United States has not ratified the
Guatemala Protocol.
l Id. art. VIII. This liability limitation of $100,000 is based upon the official
U.S. redemption rate of $35 per ounce of gold that was maintained at the time of
the signing of the Guatemala Protocol. Comment, The Revised Warsaw Convention
and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CUMB. L. REV. 764, 789 (1978). By 1978, the new
value of the liability limitation under the Guatemala Protocol was approximately
$133,367 due to two devaluations of the U.S. dollar and increases in the official
price of gold. Id
"? Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, done Sept. 25, 1975 at
Montreal, ICAO Doc. No. 9147 (1975), reprinted in 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 631 (1975)
(hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 3]; A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 985 (2d ed.
Doc. Supp. 1981).
in Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 17, art. 2.
"' Id
See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 25; see infra notes 260-299 and accom-
panying text.
- See, e.g., Broder, Airport Security, N.Y.LJ., July 11, 1985, at 4, col. 4.
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a reduction in the total number of airport terrorist inci-
dents occurring annually worldwide.23 Conversely, others
charge that abolishing the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention and its supplementary revisions would un-
fairly shift the burden of preventing and suppressing po-
tential terrorist attacks from governmental authorities24to
air carriers.25
This article will begin with an examination of the his-
tory and development of the Warsaw Convention and its
subsequent supplementary revisions. It then will attempt
to frame a working definition for the worldwide phenome-
non known as "terrorism." This article also will discuss
the expansion of liability in cases involving willful miscon-
duct and the prevention of terrorist incidents, as well as
the various security measures available to airlines and air-
ports that may be used to avert and suppress the threat of
potential terrorist attacks.
'M See, e.g., id
24 Hans J. Morgenthau, Professor of Political Science at the New School for
Social Research, has observed that:
Terrorism presents established governments with a number of
problems unprecedented in modern history. Traditionally, govern-
ments have possessed a monopoly of organized physical violence
which they would use against other governments monopolistically
endowed in a similar way or against individual citizens violating the
legal order. It is new in modem history that a group of citizens
would band together, challenging the monopoly of organized vio-
lence in the hands of the government.
Morgenthau, Foreward to TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note
1, at vii.
Alfred P. Rubin, Professor of Political Science at the University of California at
Los Angeles, argues that governments naturally shoulder the greatest responsibil-
ity for preventing and suppressing terrorism because
It]he act of terrorism constitutes a common crime under the munici-
pal law of the territory (or of the flag-state of the aircraft or vessel)
where it occurs ....
It is presumed that the normal law of any society is able to main-
tain order in that society ... [Thus, any] threat to society posed by
some acts ... is enough to justify the kind of enforcement activity
that would be necessary to suppress that threat.
Rubin, International Terrorism and International Law, in TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 121, 122-23.
25 See Airlines Urge Governments To Enforce Anti-Terrorist Measures, Reuters Ltd.,
Nov. 4, 1986 (available on NEXIS); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
1987] TERR ORIS T A TTA CK LIABILITY 329
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
CARRIER LIABILITY
A. The Warsaw Convention
On October 12, 1929, the Warsaw Convention was
completed and opened for signature in Warsaw, Poland.2 6
The Convention, a multilateral treaty27 that became effec-
tive on February 13, 1933,28 was drafted in order to
achieve two primary objectives: (1) to provide a uniform
system of regulation governing international civil avia-
tion;29 and (2) to limit the potential liability of interna-
tional air carriers for accidents.30 The parties to the treaty
20 See Note, Aeronautics Law - Warsaw Convention - Federal Court Abrogates Article
on Liability Limitation, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 429, 433 n. 28 (1983). "The
Warsaw Convention was the result of two international conferences held in Paris
in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, and of the work done by the interim Comit6 Interna-
tional Technique d'ExpertsJuridique Ariens (CITEJA) created by the Paris Con-
ference." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498.
27 One hundred fourteen countries were parties to the Warsaw Convention as
ofJuly 1976, including: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia (including Nor-
folk Island), Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, China (People's Rep.), Colombia, Congo
(Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark (not including Greenland),
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France (including
French colonies), Gabon, The Gambia, Germany (Dem. Rep.), Germany (Fed.
Rep.), Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indo-
nesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea
(Dem. Rep.), Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lux-
embourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands (including Curacao), New Zea-
land, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines,
Poland (including Free City of Danzig), Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Ara-
bia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa (including South-
west Africa), Spain (including colonies), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and To-
bago, Tunisia, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,
United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen (Aden),
Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,054 (July 1976); see also
A. LOWENFELD, AViATnON LAw ch. 7, § 4.1 (2d ed. 1981) (stating that after the
United Nations Charter, the Warsaw Convention is the next most widely adopted
of all treaties).
29 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 501-02.
' The Preamble to the Warsaw Convention states that the Convention was
designed to regulate "in a uniform manner the conditions of international trans-
portation by air in respect of the documents used for such transportation and of
the liability of the carrier." Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, at preamble.
."0 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, arts. 17-25.
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included in its provisions limitations on the potential lia-
bility of air carriers in order to attract capital and avoid
disabling losses, thereby fostering the growth of the then-
nascent airline industry. 3'
The Warsaw Convention establishes an "international
code declaring the rights and liabilities of the parties to
contracts of international carriage by air."'3 2 The Conven-
tion contains several major provisions that provide a uni-
form system for documenting baggage checks, passenger
tickets and waybills33 on international flights. 4 It also
m When the Warsaw Convention was submitted to the United States Senate in
1934, Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only
be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite
basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will
prove to be an aid in the development of international air transpor-
tation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and
equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable
result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating ex-
penses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in
the way of reduced transportation charges.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN
RULES, S. EXEC. DOc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934); see also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499 (stating that the limitation on liability was in-
tended to encourage the growth of the infant airline industry by helping airlines
"attract capital that might otherwise be scared away by the fear of a single cata-
strophic accident").
• Note, Up in the Air Without a Ticket: Interpretation and Revision of the Warsaw Con-
vention, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332, 335 (1982-83) (quoting Grein v. Imperial Air-
ways, [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 75 (C.A. 1936)); see Warsaw Convention, supra note 7,
preamble; see also Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 396, 314
N.E.2d 848, 854 (1974) ("[t]he apparent purpose of the entire Convention is uni-
formity among its diverse adherent Nations - the achievement, so far as possible,
of a uniform body of law as to the various subject matters which are covered").
The Preamble to the Warsaw Convention states that the various parties drafted
the agreement in recognition of "the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner
the conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the documents
used for such transportation and of the liability of the carrier ... " Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 7, preamble.
.1 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3-4 (ticketing and baggage check)
and arts. 5-16 (waybills).
.14 The Warsaw Convention only applies to "international transportation,"
which is defined as:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are
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helps alleviate confusion and conflict of laws problems 5
by setting standard liability limitations for air carriers in
cases of accidents that cause death or injury to passen-
gers, and in cases of damage to or loss of cargo. s
Yet, the Warsaw Convention achieves its greatest noto-
riety by placing an absolute limit on air carrier liability in
the event of passenger death or personal injury. 7 Article
17 of the Convention 38 presumes air carrier liability for
passenger injury or death caused by an "accident" occur-
ring either aboard the aircraft or while embarking or dis-
embarking.3 9 Thus, once a plaintiff passenger proves that
an accident resulting in personal injury or death occurred
situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sover-
eignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even
though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation
without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to
the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High
Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for the
purposes of this convention.
Id. art. 1, para. 2. The term "High Contracting Parties" denotes those nations
that participated in the drafting of the Warsaw Convention and later accepted the
treaty as a signatory, by adherence or ratification. See also supra notes 2 and 27 and
infra note 57 and accompanying text. For an acceptance of the Convention
through "adherence," see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
" See 1 C. SnAWCROSS & M. B.uMoNr, AIR LAW VII (i) 89 (4th ed. 1984);
Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8 ANNALs AIR & SPACE
L. 151, 153 (1983) (noting that "[t]he most important reason for achieving uni-
formity was to avoid serious and complicated conflicts of law problems which
could arise in the absence of a treaty").
" See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7,'arts. 17-30.
Id. arts. 17, 22.
" Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
Id. art. 17.
"0, Id. According to the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention, article
17 was debated extensively. The First International Conference of Private Air
Law, held in Paris in 1925, specified that "[tihe carrier is liable for accidents,
breakdowns, and delays." Conference Internationale de Droit Priv6 Aerien 87
(1936), cited in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985). Nevertheless, the
Second International Conference on Private Air Law, which reconvened in War-
saw in 1929, considered the revised draft of the agreement that the International
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either on the airplane or while the passenger was embark-
ing or disembarking, the burden of proof shifts from the
passenger to the air carrier.4" Accordingly, in order to
avoid liability, the air carrier must prove that it took "all
necessary measures" to avoid the accident,4' or that the
passenger was contributorily negligent.4 2
In exchange for placing this strong presumption of lia-
bility on the air carier under article 17, the air carrier's
liability is limited to 125,000 Poincare francs, 44 or approx-
Technical Committee of Aerial Experts (in French, Comit6 Internationale Tech-
nique d'Experts Juridiques A~iens (CITEJA)) submitted:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained during carriage: (a)
in the case of death, wounding, or any other bodily injury suffered
by a traveler; (b) in the case of destruction, loss, or damage to goods
or baggage; (c) in the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods or
baggage.
International Conference on Air Law Affecting Questions, Minutes, Second Inter-
national Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Oct. 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 264-
65 (R. Homer & D. Legrez trans. 1975) [hereinafter Minutes].
40 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, arts. 20, 21. Article 20 of the Warsaw
Convention states:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall
not be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an er-
ror in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and
that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage.
Id. art. 20 (emphasis added).
41 Id art. 20, para 1. Nowadays, however, the common law doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur automatically shifts the burden of proof to the air carrier due to the diffi-
culty in proving negligence in accidents involving civil aviation. Comment, An
Extention of the Warsaw Convention's Protection:Julius YoungJewelry Mfg. Co. v. Delta
Airlines, 5 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 497 n.1 (1980). Article 20's shift in the
burden of proof from passenger to air carrier, therefore, has become unnecessary.
d; see Hjalsted, The Air Carrier's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage in
International Air Law - Part I, 27J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1960).
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 21.
4. Id. art. 17. The strong presumption ofliability placed on air carriers is partic-
ularly significant to plaintiffs in aviation tort cases because injured victims often
cannot muster the requisite expense and expertise needed to prove an air carrier's
negligence. See Reukema, No New Deal on Liability Limits for International Flights, 18
INT'L LAw. 983, 994 (1984).
44 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22, para. 1. The Warsaw Convention
defines the Poincare franc as a coin "consisting of 65-1/2 milligrams of gold...
[that] may be converted into any national currency in round figures." Id. art. 22,
para. 4; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. When the United States
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imately $8,300, 45 under article 22.46 Moreover, the air
carrier's liability for loss of or damage to cargo is limited
to 250 Poincare francs per kilogram, 47 which equals ap-
proximately $9.07 per pound. 8
Although the drafters of the Warsaw Convention
adopted a liability limit for death or personal injury that
abandoned the gold standard in the 1970s, the dollar value of the Poincare franc
was calculated by converting the value of 65-1/2 milligrams of gold into U.S. dol-
lars. See Martin, The Price of Gold and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. 70 (1979);
Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc - A Different Point of View, 6J. MAR. L. & COM. 73,
91-92 (1974); Heller, The Warsaw Convention and the "Two Tier" Gold Market, 7 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 126, 129 (1973).
4 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22. The dollar equivalent of
$8,300 has been used since the devaluation of the franc by the U.S. in 1933. See
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499 n.10; see also Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1967) (determining that
125,000 Poincare francs converted into $8,291.87 U.S. dollars in the late 1960s);
In re Aircrash at Kimpo Int'l Airport, Korea, on November 18, 1980, 558 F. Supp.
72, 73 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (stating that the 125,000 Poincare franc limitation on lia-
bility was worth $8,291.88 in 1965).
40 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention states:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the
liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per
kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the pack-
age was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value
at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires.
In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the ac-
tual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge him-
self the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per
passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the
French franc consisting of 65-1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard
of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be con-
verted into any national currency in round figures.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; see also supra notes 10 and 44 and ac-
companying text.
47 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22, para. 2; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
4" See CAB Order No. 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974), implemented at 14
C.F.R. § 221.176 (1975).
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was considered low in 1929, 49 they also included a provi-
sion that effectively provided injured passengers with an
exception to the liability limitations of article 22. Article
25 -0 removes the liability limitations benefiting air carriers
if the injured passenger can prove that the willful miscon-
duct of the carrier, its agents or employees caused the ac-
cident and damage in question.5 1 If, on the other hand,
the injured passenger caused or contributed to the acci-
dent or damage in question, then the court in which the
action is brought may apply the law of its jurisdiction to
exonerate the air carrier in whole or in part.5 2
Any action to which the Warsaw Convention applies can
only be brought subject to its provisions.5 " Whenever its
provisions apply, therefore, the Warsaw Convention fur-
nishes the exclusive means for recovering damages from
air carriers.5 4 In addition, although air carriers may enter
independently into agreements to raise existing limita-
tions on liability, 55 any subsequent treaties tending to es-
tablish a lower liability limit than that provided in Article
-1 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499. The low limitation on liabil-
ity for death or personal injury to a passenger was included in the Warsaw Con-
vention in order to encourage the growth and survival of international civil
aviation. See id at 499-500; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
-,, Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention states:
(1) the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such fault on his part
as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is sub-
mitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circum-
stances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 25 (emphasis added).
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 503.
. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; see also supra note 42 and accompa-
nying text.
. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 24, para. 2.
:, See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (stating that the substantive law of the United States applies to injuries not
contemplated by the Warsaw Convention).
55 See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 11-19 and
accompanying text.
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22 of the Warsaw Convention are expressly void.5 6
The Warsaw Convention, by its terms, applies "to all
international transportation of persons..." by air carri-
ers for hire.58 According to the Convention, the passen-
ger ticket, which serves as the contract between air
carriers and passengers,59 must contain certain "particu-
lars,' 16 0 must be in writing, and must be delivered to the
passenger. 6' An air carrier's failure to deliver the ticket to
the passenger or to list any of the "particulars," especially
a statement of the air carrier's liability, nullifies the Con-
vention and the carrier's limitation on liability for the sub-
sequent death of or personal injury to a passenger.6 2 In
choosing the forum for an action against an air carrier, the
plaintiff must file suit "in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties" where the carrier is domiciled or has
its principal place of business, where the contract between
the parties for air transportation was made, or at the desti-
nation stipulated in the contract.63
Although the United States was an observer rather than
an official party to the international conferences that for-
"- Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 23.
- Id art. 1, para. I; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1, para. 1.
"s, The Warsaw Convention regulates the ticket issued by the carrier and ac-
cepted by the passenger which is the "contract" between parties. See In re Air
Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1120-21 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Note, supra note 32, at 338.
', Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 3, para. 1. Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention states:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars: (a)
The place and date of issue; (b) The place of departure and of desti-
nation; (c) The agreed stopping places ... ; (d) The name and ad-
dress of the carrier or carriers; (e) A statement that the
transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established
by this convention.
Id.
Id. art. 3, para. 2.
,. See, e.g., Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949)
("[D]elivery of a ticket is thus a condition set up by the Convention itself, as a
determinant of the applicability, or no, of the Convention's limited liability
rules ... ").
'- Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 28.
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mulated the Warsaw Convention,64 the United States ad-
hered65 to the treaty in 193466 upon the recommendation
of the executive branch6 7 and after several European na-
tions had ratified it.6 8 OnJuly 31, 1934, the United States
deposited its instrument of adherence to the Warsaw
Convention in the Republic of Poland's Ministry of For-
eign Affairs archives as directed by article 37 of the
treaty.69 The Warsaw Convention went into effect for the
United States on October 29, 1934.70
B. The Hague Protocol
From the time it adhered to the Convention, however,
the United States expressed dissatisfaction with the low
limits on air carrier liability under the agreement.7 ' In ad-
4 See Minutes, supra note 39, at 10 (acknowledging United States negotiators as
official observers).
1" See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 38. Article 38 provides nations that
were not parties to the Convention's formulation a method by which the treaty
can be adopted. Specifically, article 38 states:
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open
for adherence by any state. (2) The adherence shall be effected by a
notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting
Parties thereof. (3) The adherence shall take effect as from the nine-
tieth day after the notification made to the Government of the Re-
public of Poland.
On June 15, 1934, the United States Senate approved the Warsaw Conven-
tion by the two-thirds vote required by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2;see 78 CoNG. REC. 11,577 (1934) (Senate approved resolution of ratifica-
tion supporting adherence to Warsaw Convention by voice vote with no floor
debate).
,67 While the executive branch of the government may enter into treaties with
other nations, ratification remains within the exclusive province of the United
States Senate. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d
303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'g 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 466 U.S.
243 (1984).
'- By the end of 1933, 12 nations including most of the European countries had
ratified the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 501-
02.
- Id. at 502.
70 Id. Essentially, the U.S. became a High Contracting Party to the agreement.
l ; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
71 Almost immediately after the United States adhered to the Warsaw Conven-
tion in 1934, some in this country began proposing revisions of the limitations on
air carrier liability provided by the Convention. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
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dition, the special protection guaranteed to international
air carriers under the low liability limitations of the War-
saw Convention became less justified 72 as the aviation in-
dustry grew much safer,73 more stable and increasingly
profitable. Moreover, in developed nations such as Great
Britain, France and the United States, recoveries in do-
mestic airline accidents far surpassed the amount of re-
covery allowed under the Warsaw Convention for
international aviation accidents. 74 Thus, in order to ad-
dress the long-standing debate over the inadequacies of
the Warsaw Convention, an international diplomatic con-
ference was convened at the Hague in September 1955. 75
At the Hague Conference, the United States delegation
became the leading champion of a higher limitation on air
carrier liability. 6 The United States delegates originally
proposed an amendment to the Warsaw Convention that
would increase the liability limit from $8,300 to 375,000
Poincare francs, or approximately $25,000. 77 After con-
siderable debate and compromise, however, the United
States delegates settled for a liability limit of $16,600 for
passenger death or injury.78 The parties at the Hague
Conference also altered the language of the willful mis-.
supra note 10, at 504. Proponents of a higher liability limitation argued that rais-
ing the limit would not adversely affect the airline industry because air carriers
could obtain low-cost liability insurance. Id.; see also Note, supra note 32, at 341.
72 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 504; see also A. LOWENFELD,
AviATION LAw, ch. 7, § 4.1 (2d ed. 1981).
73 Noting that the aviation industry was past its early stages of existence, one
court stated that "[t]he pioneering conditions and the lack of technical advance-
ment and passenger safeguards which faced the industry when [the] Warsaw
[Convention] was adopted have been supplanted by a technologically and com-
mercially mature industry." In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114,
1125 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
71 Loggans, Personal Injury Damages in International Aviation Litigation: The Plain-
tiff's Perspective, 13J. MARSHALL L. REv. 541, 545 (1980).
7- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 504-05.
-' Id. at 506-07.
7 Id at 506.
70 Hague Protocol, supra note 11, art. 11. The Hague Protocol exactly doubled
the Warsaw Convention limitation on liability to 250,000 Poincare francs, or ap-
proximately $16,600. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 507; see also
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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conduct provision,79 so that damage created by an act of
the carrier with intent to cause damage, or with reckless-
ness and knowledge that damage will probably result, es-
tablishes willful misconduct. 80
Although the United States delegates at the Hague
were not entirely satisfied with the small increase in the
liability limitation,81 the United States signed the resultant
agreement known as the Hague Protocol in 1956.82 It was
not until 1959 that President Eisenhower submitted the
agreement to the United States Senate where it remained
in committee for two years. 83 The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee supported the Hague Protocol, 84 but the
Senate failed to take any action.8 5 Thus, the $8,300 liabil-
ity limit under the Warsaw Convention remained in effect
71, Some argue that article 25 of the Warsaw Convention was modified to render
willful misconduct more difficult to prove. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 10, at 505-06. For a discussion of the willful misconduct provision embodied
in article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying
text.
"I Hague Protocol, supra note 11, art. XIII (amending art. 25 of the Warsaw
Convention).
a' See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 510.
82 As ofJune 1983, 86 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, including: Af-
ghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China (People's Rep.).
Congo (Brazzavile), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslavakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Domini-
can Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, German Democratic
Republic, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Korea, Korean People's
Democratic Rep., Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Malagasy
Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Po-
land, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, South Af-
rica, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Swaziland, Togo,
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukranian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Notification of Succession). 3 Av. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 27,128 (June 1983).
".' See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 515-16.
While the committee recommended that the Hague Protocol be ratified, it
also stated that if insurance legislation, mandating that domestic air carriers pro-
vide additional insurance protection of up to $50,000 plus $10,000 for medical
expenses, was not enacted within a reasonable time after ratification of the Proto-
col, the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol both should be denounced.
Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965).
" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 515-16.
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in the United States.8 6
C. The Montreal Agreement
As it became clear that the United States Senate would
not ratify the Hague Protocol, it also became increasingly
apparent that many senators categorically opposed any
type of liability limitations.8 7 Pressure aimed against the
low liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention seemed
to indicate the likelihood of an impending denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention by the United States pursuant to
article 39 of the treaty.88 Although reluctant to denounce
the Warsaw Convention, 9 United States government offi-
cials saw no alternative but to give notice of denuncia-
tion90 due to the growing discrepancy between recoveries
for domestic and international civil aviation accidents.9 1
Thus, in order to emphasize the seriousness of its posi-
tion, the United States submitted a formal Notice of De-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention to the government
of Poland on November 15, 1962.92 Nevertheless, the de-
No 1 L. KREINDLER, AvjATIoN ACCIDENT LAWs § 12.0313] (1986).
87 See generally Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 10, at 515-63.
" See id. at 546-52. Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention states:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this
convention by a notification addressed to the Government of the Re-
public of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each
of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification
of denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which
shall have proceeded to denunciation.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 39.
- Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the United States would be a
setback not only to the development of international civil aviation law, but also to
international cooperation as a whole. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at
534, 548-49.
-" Id. at 549.
9, Id. at 553 (citing Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) charts that demonstrate:
"(1) the average recovery between 1950 and 1964 for a fatality on a Warsaw [in-
ternational aviation] case was 6,489 dollars as compared to 38,499 average recov-
ery on a non-Warsaw [domestic aviation] case and (2) during the... period [of
1958-64], the average recovery for a fatality on a non-Warsaw case had risen to
over 52,000 dollars.").
- Department of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965). The
notice of denunciation was a diplomatic note sent by the United States Embassy in
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nunciation, which would not become effective until May
15, 1966, 93 explained that the United States wished to re-
main in the uniform and cooperative Warsaw system.94 In
particular, the United States suggested that it would with-
draw the denunciation if there was a reasonable prospect
that a new international agreement could be reached pro-
viding a new limitation on liability in the area of
$100,000. 9- In light of the six month deadline for revoca-
tion of the denunciation, an international diplomatic con-
ference, subsequently known as the Montreal Conference,
convened in Montreal in 1966 in order to amend the low
liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention.96 The par-
ties at the Montreal Conference, however, failed to estab-
lish new limits on air carrier liability, and the conference
closed without reaching an agreement.97
Responding to the imminent threat of U.S. denuncia-
Warsaw to the government of Poland. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at
551.
"- See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 39, para. 2 (providing that denunci-
ation will not become effective until six months after formal notification of denun-
ciation); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Department of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965). The
Notice of Denunciation recognizes that:
To this end, the United States of America stands ready to participate
in the negotiation of a revision of the Warsaw Convention which
would provide susbtantially higher limits, or of a convention cover-
ing the other matters contained in the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol but without limits of liability for personal injury or
death.
Id. at 925.
"i Id. The press release announcing the denunciation stated that:
The United States would be prepared to withdraw the notice of de-
nunciation deposited today if prior to its effective date of May 15,
1966, there is a reasonable prospect of an international agreement
on limits of liability in international air transportation in the area of
$100,000 per passenger or on uniform rules but without any limit of
liability, and if, pending the effectiveness of such international
agreement, there is a provisional arrangement among the principal
international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per
passenger.
Id. at 924.
!"I See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 563-75. Even after the dele-
gates had convened in Montreal to establish a new limitation on air carrier liabil-
ity, the Notice of Denunciation was not withdrawn. Id. at 563.
1.7 Id at 575.
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tion of the Warsaw Convention, United States and foreign
officials looked for an acceptable accommodation that
would allow the United States to continue its participation
in the Warsaw system. 98 Less than a week before the effec-
tive date of the United States denunciation, all United
States air carriers and most foreign carriers accepted an
interim private agreement, commonly known as the Mon-
treal Agreement,99 pursuant to that provision of the War-
saw Convention which specifically allows airlines to
contract with each other to increase existing liability limi-
tations.' 00 On May 14, 1966, the United States formally
withdrew its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, the
day before it became effective. '0 '
The Montreal Agreement is a contract between the
United States and the principal United States and foreign
international air carriers serving the United States10 2 that
neither directly involves nations participating in the War-
Id. at 587.
Montreal Agreement, supra note 13. The Montreal Agreement is also known
as the Montreal Interim Agreement. See, e.g., Loggans, supra note 74, at 547.
100 Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22, para. 1. (specifying that "by spe-
cial contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liabil-
ity"); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
10, Department of State Press Release No. 111, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 956 (1966). On
May 12, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted a resolution that
advised against withdrawing the Notice of Denunciation unless all U.S. air carriers
agreed to waive the liability limitations up to $75,000 inclusive of legal fees and
costs. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1966, at 18, col. 3. The following day, May 13, 1966,
the United States announced that it intended to remain within the framework of
the Warsaw Convention. The United States also announced approval by the CAB
of the Montreal Agreement, an interim accord submitted by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). Department of State Press Release No. 110, 54 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 955, 955-56 (1966). The United States did not formally retract the de-
nunciation until the next day, May 14, 1966. Department of State Press Release No.
111, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 956, 956-57 (1966).
-o'z "The Montreal Agreement is not an international treaty but is merely an
agreement between air carriers approved by the United States Government. Such
an agreement is sanctioned by article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention."
Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hyacked Aircraft, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 339,
351 n.67 (1972). For a complete list of all U.S. and foreign air carriers that have
signed the Montreal Agreement, see 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,130 (June 1983).
See also 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, (D) 45-49 (4th ed. 1984) (list-
ing the signatories to the Montreal Agreement).
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saw system, 0 3 nor amends the Warsaw Convention it-
self.'" 4 Under the Agreement, the signatories agree to
raise the liability limit from $8,300 under the Warsaw
Convention to $75,000 per passenger'0 5 for death or in-
jury occurring on international flights when the United
States is a "point of origin, a point of destination, or
scheduled stopping point." 0 6
In addition to raising the liability limitation to $75,000,
the Montreal Agreement suspends an air carrier's defense
under article 20 of the Warsaw Convention 0 7 and instead
provides for "no-fault" or absolute liability. 08 By impos-
ing absolute liability on air carriers, the Montreal Agree-
ment goes beyond both the presumption of liability
standard of article 20 and the common law doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.'0 9 Thus, under the Montreal Agreement, the
103 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 13 (noting that air carriers rather than
nations participating in the Warsaw system signed the Montreal Agreement). Al-
together, more than 150 air carriers, many of these foreign, adopted the Montreal
Agreement. See A. LOWENFELD, AvIATION LAW, Ch. 7, at § 5.42 (2d ed. 1981); see
also S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 11.19 (1978).
104 See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d. 1256, 1259 n.6
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (emphasizing that the Montreal Agree-
ment is a contract among airlines rather than a treaty).
'o The Montreal Agreement states that the "limit of liability for each passenger
for death, wounding, or other bodily injury [is] $75,000 inclusive of legal fees and
costs .... Montreal Agreement, supra note 13, § 1(1). The Agreement also spec-
ifies that if legal fees and costs are excluded, recovery is limited to $58,000. Id.
,on See id. § 1. Specifically, the Montreal Agreement states that its "limitations
shall be applicable to international transportation by the carrier as in the (War-
saw] Convention or [Hague] Protocol which includes a point in the United States
as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place." Id. The
Montreal Agreement also provides that the passenger ticket will determine
whether the United States is "a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed
stopping place." See id.; Note, supra note 32, at 345.
1' Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention allows an air carrier to avoid liability if
it can prove either that it took "all necessary measures" to avoid the damages in
question, or that such measures were impossible to carry out. See supra notes 40-
41 and accompanying text.
I'- See Montreal Agreement, supra note 13, § 1(2). The Montreal Agreement
states that "[t]he Carrier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of the
death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of any defense
under Article 20(1) of [the Warsaw] Convention or [the Warsaw] Convention as
amended by [the Hague] Protocol." Id.
,, See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Under domestic aviation law, prin-
ciples of negligence generally govern an air carrier's liability for passenger injury
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mere proof that an accident occurred necessarily will lead
to a recovery of at least $75,000110 because an air carrier
can no longer defend itself based on article 20 of the War-
saw Convention."'
Since the Montreal Agreement incorporates all un-
amended provisions of the Warsaw Convention,1 12 the
willful misconduct exception of article 25 remains in
force."'3 The plaintiff who seeks unlimited damages, how-
ever, still shoulders the burden of proof. 1 4 Recovery may
exceed the $75,000 limitation on air carrier liability im-
posed by the Montreal Agreement, therefore, whenever
the plaintiff can prove willful misconduct on the part of
the carrier.
D. The Guatemala Protocol
In 1970, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)"' released
or death. See Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus,
the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often aids negligence claims by permit-
ting an inference of negligence on the part of the carrier. W. KEATON, PROSSER
AND KEATON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 242-47 (5th ed. 1984).
1,o Although it established absolute liability, the Montreal Agreement did not
establish an absolute ceiling on liability. Recoveries exceeding the $57,000 limita-
tion on liability under the Agreement, therefore, can be imposed upon an air car-
rier if a plaintiff can prove the carrier's willful misconduct. See Montreal
Agreement, supra note 13; see also infra notes 260-299 and accompanying text.
a' Under the Montreal Agreement, the only issue to be resolved in litigation is
whether the air carrier was guilty of willful misconduct. If willful misconduct is
found, there is no limitation on the liability of the carrier. See Montreal Agree-
ment, supra note 13, § 1(2).
112 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 597.
11: The Montreal Agreement states that "[n]othing herein shall be deemed to
affect the rights and liabilities of the Carrier with regard to any claim brought by,
on behalf of, or in respect of any person who has wilfully caused damage which
resulted in death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger." Montreal
Agreement, supra note 13, § 1(2). The purpose is to prevent "[t]hose guilty of
sabotage and persons claiming on their behalf... [from] recover[ing] any dam-
ages." Department of State Press Release No. 110, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955, 956 (1966).
114 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
The CAB no longer exists. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(3) (1982). The Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978 gave the power formerly possessed by the CAB over inter-
state aviation and foreign air transportation in the United States to the U.S.
Department of Transportation for use in consultation with the U.S. Department of
State. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 94 Stat. 1705
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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a study showing that $100,000 did not satisfy even eight
percent of all settlements reached in the lJr'lited States for
deaths occurring on domestic flights and that the average
recovery actually surpassed $200,000.116 Recognizing the
growing discrepancy in recoveries between domestic avia-
tion accidents and international aviation accidents," 7 the
United States joined with other members of the interna-
tional community at a diplomatic conference held in Gua-
temala City in 1971 to revise the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol.""
The resulting Guatemala City Protocol,' 9 an interna-
tional treaty designed to amend the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, attempted to moderize the state
of the law with respect to international air carrier liabil-
ity. 120 The most significant change enunciated in the Gua-
temala City Protocol was an increase in the limitation on
air carrier liabiltiy to $100,000 for passenger death or in-
jury.' 2' In exchange for increasing the liability limit, how-
"' Aviation Protocols: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1977) [hereinafter Aviation Protocols Hearings] (prepared state-
ment of Lee S. Kreindler, Association of Trial Lawyers of America). The results
of the CAB study were based upon information gathered from U.S. air carriers
concerning aviation accidents that occurred between 1966 and 1970. For the re-
sults of this study, see id. at 23 (prepared statement and attachments of Peter B.
Schwarzkopf, Assistant to the General Counsel, International Affairs, CAB).
" See id.
"' Since the $75,000 limit on liability under the Montreal Agreement only ap-
plied to flights arriving, departing or stopping in the United States, the $8,300
liability limit of the Warsaw Convention and the $16,600 liability limit of the
Hague Protocol were still the applicable ceilings in most of the world. See supra
notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 15.
o STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., RE-
PORT ON MONTREAL AVIATION PROTOcoLs Nos. 3 AND 4, at 3 (Comm. Print 1983)
(hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Only 25 countries have signed the Guatemala City
Protocol, including: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
27,129 Uune 1983).
'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 3. This increased limitation on air carrier
liability, which still was based on the Poincare franc, now was set at 1,500,000
francs. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 15, art. VIII (amending article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention). In addition to raising the liability limit to approximately
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ever, the Guatamala City Protocol eliminated the willful
misconduct exception of the Warsaw Convention, the
Hague Protocol and the Montreal Agreement, thereby
rendering the $100,000 limitation on liability absolute. 22
Moreover, at the insistence of the United States, the Gua-
temala City Protocol included a provision permitting in-
dividual nations to establish domestic compensation plans
to supplement a passenger's $100,000 limit on
recovery. 12 3
E. The Montreal Protocols
After the Guatemala City Protocol had been opened for
signature, and before the United States could consider its
ratification, a series of international diplomatic confer-
ences was held in Montreal primarily to negotiate detailed
provisions concerning cargo shipments. 24 The Montreal
Diplomatic Conference, the final conference of the series,
was held in September 1975.125 Against the background
of a moribund international gold standard that still served
as the basis for world currency conversion, 126 delegates at
$100,000, the Guatemala City Protocol also increased the liability limitation on
cargo from $9 per pound to $1,000 per passenger. SENATE REPORT, supra note
120, at 3.
- See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125 SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 3. In accordance with this provision of
the Guatemala City Protocol, the United States developed a supplemental com-
pensation plan (SCP) in consort with the Prudential Insurance Company that
would provide coverage totaling $200,000 per passenger in addition to the ap-
proximately $100,000 limit on air carrier liability under the Protocol. OnJuly 20,
1977, the CAB approved this SCP as an inter-carrier agreement based on § 412 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976). SENATE REPORT, SUpra
note 120, at 3.
124 SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 3. The 1974 ICAO Legal Subcommittee
drafted preliminary cargo provisions that formed the basis for the Montreal Diplo-
matic Conference which convened in Montreal in September 1975. Id.
12, Id at 4; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126 Until the early 1970s, the value of the United States dollar in terms of gold
was maintained pursuant to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1945. Bretton
Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, ch. 339, § 2, 59 Stat. 512 (1945)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)). The United States, however, suspended the
redemption of U.S. dollars for gold at $35 per ounce in 1971 in order to alleviate
pressures that were raising the free market price of gold above the official price.
See Comment, supra note 10, at 185-86. As a result, it became impractical to use
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the 1975 Montreal Diplomatic Conference were per-
suaded to substitute the Standard Drawing Right (SDR)t"7
for the existing Poincare franc conversion clause of the
Warsaw Convention.1 2 8
In total, the parties to the Montreal Diplomatic Confer-
ence adopted four separate protocols known collectively
as the Montreal Protocols.1 29 The first three protocols,
Montreal Nos. 1-3, in effect substituted the SDR for the
Poincare franc as the unit of conversion for calculating air
carrier liability for passenger injury or death. 30 The
fourth protocol, Montreal No. 4, amended the cargo pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention, as revised by the
Hague Protocol.'"t
The Montreal Protocols, however, were not submitted
to the United States Senate until 1977. Although it con-
ducted hearings, 3 2 the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee did not recommend ratification of the Montreal
Protocols until 1983.133 When Montreal Protocols No. 3
and No. 4 came before the full Senate for approval in
March 1983,134 several factors initially indicated that the
Protocols would be ratified.'3 5 Yet, when floor vote was
the official price of gold as the standard of conversion under the Warsaw
Convention.
,27 The SDR is essentially a hybrid currency consisting of a weighted value of
five major currencies calculated according to a specified formula. See Ward, The
SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 3
(1981). The five currencies upon which the SDR is calculated are: (1) the United
States dollar; (2) the Deutsche mark; (3) the French franc; (4) the Japanese yen;
and (5) the British pound sterling. Id.; see Comment, supra note 10, at 184. On
December 31, 1983, for example, one SDR was equivalent to 8.3475 French
francs. 13 IMF Survey 17, 29 (Jan. 23, 1984).
'-" SENATE REPOR', supra note 120, at 4; see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 4.
I d.
Id. at 5.
" See Aviation Protocols Hearings, supra note 116.
'- SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 5.
See generally 129 CONG. REC. S1838-40 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983); 129 CONG.
REC. S2235-62 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONG. REC. S2270-79 (daily ed. Mar.
8, 1983).
1- One factor that indicated that ratification was in the offing was the sixteen to
one vote the Senate Foreign Relations Committee mustered to endorse the Proto-
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taken, less than the required two-thirds of the Senate
voted to ratify the Protocols.- 6
The two major changes contemplated by the Montreal
Protocols that received the most attention in the Senate
concerned: (1) the establishment of absolute liability upon
air carriers in the event of passenger death or personal
injury, and (2) the elimination of the willful misconduct
exception of the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol
and the Montreal Agreement. 3 7 The first of these two
major changes proposed by the Montreal Protocols and
hotly contested in the United States Senate, the imposi-
tion of absolute liability on air carriers, 3 8 came about as
the direct result of removing the "all necessary measures"
or "due care" defense previously permitted under article
20 of the Warsaw Convention. 3 9 Although the United
States had been operating under a system of absolute lia-
bility for 17 years pursuant to the Montreal Agreement, 40
the Montreal Protocols represented the first multilateral
treaty to include a no-fault provision.
The second major change provided by the Montreal
Protocols that was debated by the Senate' 4' appeared in
I
cols. SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 5. Another indication that seemingly
pointed to imminent ratification of the Protocols was the fact that the U.S. Senate
had not rejected a treaty for over twenty years. See 129 CONG. REC. S2276 (daily
ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). Nevertheless, the Senate heav-
ily contested ratification of the Protocols. See generally 129 CONG. REC. S2235-62
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONG. REC. S2270-79 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
on Vote in Senate Fails to Ratify Montreal Protocols on Liability, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., March 14, 1983, at 264.
.1" See generally 129 CONG. REC. S2235-62 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983); 129 CONG.
REC. S2270-79 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
'-' See article 17 and article 20 of the consolidated text of The Provisions of the
Revised Warsaw Convention Applicable to the United States in the Event of Rati-
fication of Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 and Termination of 1929 Version of the
Convention, reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 23-37 [hereinafter Con-
solidated Text].
,1," See supra note 40 and accompanying text. While article 20 of the Consoli-
dated Text allows air carriers to use the "all necessary measures" defense for
damage caused by delay, it does not allow use of the defense for death or personal
injury. See Consolidated Text, supra note 138, at 29.
,4" See Montreal Agreement, supra note 13, § 1(2).
', The elimination of the willful misconduct clause perhaps served to generate
more enthusiasm amongst those senators opposed to ratification of the Protocols
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provisions eliminating the willful misconduct exception of
article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 42 which previously
permitted the amount of recovery to exceed the limitation
on liability whenever the carrier's "willful misconduct"
could be shown.' 43 The Montreal Protocols created an
unsurpassable limit on liability of 100,000 SDRs for pas-
senger death or injury,' 44 1000 SDRs per passenger for
damage to or loss of baggage,1 45 and 17 SDRs per kilo-
gram for damage, loss or delay in the carriage of cargo. 46
The elimination of the willful misconduct exception only
becomes manifest in the provision of the Consolidated
Text of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Mon-
treal Protocols that states, "[s]uch limits of liability consti-
tute maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever
the circumstances which gave rise to the liability."'' 47
Elimination of the willful misconduct exception was ob-
jected to vehemently in the Senate debates by opponents
of ratification such as Senator Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina. 48 Senator Hollings stated in debate that the
elimination of the willful misconduct exception would
alert air carriers to the fact that even in cases of flagrant
recklessness, their liability would never exceed the limits
set in the Montreal Protocols.' 49 Thus, Senator Hollings
than did any other proposed change. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. S2246 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 17 (referring to articles 10 and 11 of
Montreal Protocol No. 3).
" See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
14 See Consolidated Text, supra note 138, art. 22, para. 1(a), at 30. One hun-
dred thousand SDRs equaled approximately $109,000 in March 1983. 129 CONG.
REC. S2239 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy).
1' See Consolidated Text, supra note 138, art. 22, para. 1(c), at 30.
14.. See id. art. 22, para. 2(a).
,47 See Consolidated Text, supra note 138, art. 24, at 32.
14" 129 CONG. REC. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
14, Id. In particular, Sen. Hollings stated:
To remove from potential discovery the carelessness - or even
recklessness - of airlines, both foreign and domestic, is to thwart
one of the two primary goals of the American tort system: Preven-
tion. To limit the possible recovery of an American family ... is to
destroy the other goal of our tort system, namely, compensation.
The Montreal Protocols are unique in that they would nullify both
goals simultaneously.
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feared that the removal of the willful misconduct excep-
tion might prompt air carriers to relax safety precau-
tions. 50 The subsequent failure of the Senate to ratify the
Montreal Protocols' 5 created even more confusion and
disarray than already existed in the area of international
civil aviation law. Indeed, the situation regarding interna-
tional air carrier liability did not become clear until thir-
teen months later when the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Tram World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp. 152
F. The Supreme Court's Decision in Franklin Mint
The Franklin Mint case originated when the Franklin
Mint Corporation (Franklin Mint) delivered a $250,000153
collection of numismatic materials to Trans World Air-
lines (TWA) for transportation from Philadelphia to
London.15 4  The shipment was subsequently lost.1 55
Although it made no special declaration of value at the
time the collection was delivered to TWA,15 6 Franklin
Mint brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York to recover from TWA
an amount greater than the liability limit set by the War-





Fifty senators voted to ratify the Protocols, forty-two voted against it, and
one senator answered "present." See 129 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8.
1983). This vote total fell far short of the required approval of two-thirds of the
senators present. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
1.2 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
,.1-" Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), modified, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
IN Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 246.
'" Id.
'.' Id. If Franklin Mint had made a special declaration of value at the time of
delivery, and paid an additional fee, an amount not exceeding the declared value
of the shipment would have been recoverable. See Warsaw Convention, supra note
7, art. 22, para. 2; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
1.1 Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 304-05; see Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art.
22, para. 2 (setting limitations on liability for international transportation of
cargo).
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The district court held that TWA's liability was limited
to $6,475.98 based on the Warsaw Convention. 58 The
court derived this figure from the liability limit established
by the Convention, the last official price of gold in the
United States and the weight of the lost shipment of nu-
mismatic materials.' 5 9 While the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment, it also ruled that 60 days from the issu-
ance of its decision the Warsaw Convention's liability lim-
its would be prospectively unenforceable in the United
States.°60 In this regard, the Second Circuit reasoned that
article 22 of the Warsaw Convention,16 1 which specified
liability limits in terms of gold francs, 62 became unen-
forceable in the United States because Congress aban-
doned the unit of conversion used by the Convention
through its 1976 repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act,16 3 effective in 1978.'6 Thus, the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the liability limits of the Warsaw Conven-
tion were prospectively unenforceable in United States
courts effectively abrogated the Convention. 65
In reviewing the Second Circuit's decision in Franklin
Mint, the United States Supreme Court reinstated the va-
lidity of the Warsaw Convention, reversing the Second
i., Franklin Mint, 525 F. Supp. at 1289.
151) Id.
" Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311.
wt See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
162 See id.; see also Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 254 n.25.
""i, Par Value Modification Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat. 116 (1972),
amended by Par Value Modification Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-110, 87 Stat. 352
(1973) (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 499 (1976)), repealed by Act of Oct. 19,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976) (repealing the Par Value Modifica-
tion Act effective April 1, 1978).
- Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 249-50. In this connection, the Second Circuit
stated that by repealing the Par Value Modification Act:
Congress thus abandoned the unit of conversion specified by the
Convention and did not substitute a new one. Substitution of a new
term is a political question, unfit for judicial resolution. We hold,
therefore, that the Convention's limits on liability for loss of cargo
are unenforceable in United States Courts.
Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311 (footnote omitted).
,6s Franklin Mini, 690 F.2d at 311.
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Circuit's ruling that the Convention was prospectively un-
enforceable in United States courts. 66 The Supreme
Court reached this conclusion by examining and analyz-
ing two different issues. First, the Court discussed
whether the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act by
Congress rendered the liability limit of the Warsaw Con-
vention unenforceable in the United States.' 67 Second,
the Court discussed the appropriate unit of conversion in
determining the limitation on liability under the Warsaw
Convention.'6 8
In determining whether the 197816'9 repeal of the Par
Value Modification Act rendered the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limit unenforceable in the United States,
the Supreme Court first noted the existence of "a firm
and obviously sound canon of construction against find-
ing implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional
action."' 70 The Court found that neither the legislative
history nor text of the act that repealed the Par Value
Modification Act made any reference to the Warsaw Con-
vention.' 7 1' Since "[l]egislative silence is not sufficient to
abrogate a treaty,"' 7 2 the Court held that the repeal of the
Par Value Modification Act was unrelated to the Warsaw
Convention.'17  Thus, the Court concluded that "[t]he re-
peal of a purely domestic piece of legislation should...
not be read as an implicit abrogation of any part of [the
Warsaw Convention]."'' 74
After considering a number of policy questions,'7 5 the
Court determined that "the erosion of the international
"- Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 253. Technically, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Second Circuit, because the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
Warsaw Convention was unenforceable in U.S. courts was to be applied prospec-
tively only. See Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 311.
"07 Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 251-53.
- Id. at 254-60.
'- See supra note 163 and accompanying text.





17.. See id at 252-53.
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gold standard and the 1978 repeal of the Par Value Modi-
fication Act cannot be construed as terminating or repudi-
ating the United States' duty to abide by the [Warsaw]
Convention's cargo liability limit. 11 76 Having reached this
conclusion, the Court next sought to determine the ap-
propriate unit of conversion in order to ascertain the lia-
bility limitations of the Warsaw Convention.
The Supreme Court held that the appropriate unit for
converting the Warsaw Convention's liability limit into
United States dollars was the last official price of gold in
the United States. 7 7 The Court based its decision on a
policy ofjudicial deference to the exclusive treaty-making
powers 78 of the political branches of the United States
government. 79 According to the Court, the liability limit
set by the CAB of $9.07 per pound for damage to or loss
of cargo 80 "represented an Executive Branch determina-
tion, made pursuant to properly delegated authority, of
the appropriate rate for converting the [Warsaw] Conven-
tion's liability limits into United States dollars."'' The
Court, therefore, concluded that it was bound to uphold a
cargo liability limit of $9.07 per pound because "the
CAB's decision to continue using a $42.22 per ounce of
gold conversion rate after the repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act was corisistent with domestic law and
with the [Warsaw] Convention itself, construed in light of
17Cd .d at 253.
1,7 Id at 261. The Par Value Modification Act of 1973 set the last official price
of gold at $42.22 per ounce. See supra note 163.
17H U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'7,, See Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). In Bra-
den the Supreme Court stated:
The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the
courts ofjustice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provi-
sions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States. It is
their duty to interpret it and administer it according to its terms.
Id. The Supreme Court has upheld this reasoning in subsequent cases. See Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288-89
(1902).
- 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1975) (increasing the dollar-based limitation on liabil-
ity to $9.07 per pound of cargo).
is, Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 254.
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its purposes, the understanding of its signatories, and its
international implementation since 1929."182 Thus, by
unequivocally declaring that the Warsaw Convention re-
mains enforceable in the United States, 8 the Supreme
Court ensured the Convention's continued applicability in
typical international air accident litigation. t 4
III. ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Before determining whether a terrorist act may subject
air carriers to unlimited liability under the willful miscon-
duct exception of the Warsaw Convention,"' 5 it is neces-
sary first to formulate a working definition of terrorism. It
has become commonplace to assert that no generally ac-
cepted definition of terrorism exists.18 6  Definitional
problems 8 7 arise in large part because conduct that one
152 Id. at 261.
W The Supreme Court concluded "that the [liability] limit (of the Warsaw Con-
vention] remains enforceable in United States courts." Id. at 253.
See supra notes 166-182 and accompanying text.
'' See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
B.JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW MODE OF CONFLICT 9 (1975):
STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON INTERNAL SECURITY, 93D CONG.,
2D SESS., TERRORISM 5 (Comm. Print 1974); Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of
Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380 (1974) (arguing that the term international terror-
ism "is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal pur-
pose"); Dugard, International Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 INT'L AFF. 67
(1974); Dugard, Towards the Definition ofInternational Terrorism, 67 AM.J. INT'L L. 94
(1973); Singh, Political Terrorism: An Overview, Paper Presented to the 34th Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, in Chicago, III. (Apr. 29 -
May 1, 1976) (stating that terrorism is politically motivated, selective in design,
and effective in result).
-7, One commentator has noted that:
The problem of defining terrorism is compounded by the fact that
terrorism has recently become a fad word used promiscuously and
often applied to a variety of acts of violence which are not strictly
terrorism by definition. It is generally pejorative. Some govern-
ments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by
their political opponents, while antigovernment extremists fre-
quently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called
terrorism thus seems to depend on point of view. Use of the term
implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach
the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded
others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys
do.
B. JENKINS, supra note 186, at 2.
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party classifies as terrorism may be viewed by others as
the noble acts of "freedom fighters."' 8 8
Nevertheless, "terrorism"'18 9 has been defined as "[a]
policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it
is adopted."' 90 "Terror," in turn, decribes "violence...
committed by groups in order to intimidate a population
or government into granting their demands .. ."91 Yet,
"violence," which characterizes a damaging or injurious
action that is used to inspire terror,1 92 is distinguishable
'" A recent analysis of international terrorism suggested that "[I]ike the
crusader of a bygone era, the modern-day terrorist sees himself as being engaged
in a just war in which right and justice are exclusively on his side and he is ab-
solved from the customary restraints on the use of violence employed in his strug-
gle." Dugard, International Terrorism and the Just War, in THE MORALITY OF
TERRORISM 77 (D. Rapoport & Y. Alexander eds. 1982); see Wilkinson, The Laws of
War and Terrorism, in THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM, supra, at 309 ('"terrorism' is
[often] merely a pejorative for 'guerrilla' or 'freedom fighter' ").
I'll The term "terrorism" orginated in the era of the French Revolution and the
subsequent Jacobin dictatorship which used state-controlled terror as an instru-
ment of political oppression and social control during the so-called Reign of Ter-
ror of the early 1790s. See Friedlander, The Origins of International Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 31.
, XI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 216 (1933). Ambassador Benjamin
Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has defined terrorism
as "the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent
to inspire fear for political ends." Address by U.S. Deputy Attorney General Ar-
nold I. Burns, The Lawyers Division of the Anti-Defamation League Appeal 3
(Dec. 17, 1986) [hereinafter Burns' Address].
... WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1218 (1985).
-2' See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1350 (2d College ed. 1982). At
least one commentator has insisted that
there is a sharp distinction between violence and terror which the con-
temporary literature too often blurs. Violence may well be a univer-
sal phenomenon, as inseparable from the human condition as is the
sense of frustration and anxiety which produces that violence. Tojustify violence we usually argue that the persons we want to hurt
either deserve punishment for misdeeds or that they deserve it be-
cause they can hurt us and intend to do so. A very different kind of
logic is required to justify terror. The victims do not manifestly
threaten us; they are innocent by conventional moral standards or by
the evidence of our own senses. Terrorists, therefore, abandon or-
dinary conceptions and experiences, and they normally avoid speak-
ing of their victims as persons. Depending on the context, the
victims become symbols, tools, animals or corrupt beings. To be a
terrorist one must have a special picture of the world, a specific con-
sciousness. Terrorism, consequently, cannot be a universal phenom-
enon. It must be, and the evidence shows that is, an historical one,
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from "force." Although the longstanding philosophical
dichotomy between force and violence may seem pedan-
tic, it is valuable to differentiate the legitimate use of force
by the state and its agencies in restraining, preventing or
punishing transgressions of the law, from the use of vio-
lence which, lacking the power of constitutional and legal
sanction, is essentially arbitrary.1 93
It also is useful for definitional purposes to distinguish
terrorism from revolution. Although both terrorism and
revolution are politically motivated, "revolution" de-
scribes "[a] sudden political overthrow.., brought about
from within a [political] system"1 9 4 while "terrorism" de-
scribes an act that "occurs when the terrorist, seeking
concessions from a state, international institution, mul-
tinational corporation or similar body applies violence
against individuals or entities that have no direct connec-
tion to the dispute."' 95 Moreover, "revolution," whose
primary goal is to overthrow an established govern-
ment,196 does not necessarily embody negative connota-
tions, whereas "terrorism," whose primary goal often is to
coerce rather than to overthrow an established govern-
ment, generally is considered "repulsive or shocking
emerging only at particular times and associated with particular de-
velopments in a people's consciousness.
Rapoport, Introduction to THE MoRALnm OF TERRORISM, supra note 188, at xiii
(some emphasis added).
' See Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 309.
' THE AMERICAN HEarrAGE DICrIONARY 1058 (2d College ed. 1982). A revolt
differs from an insurrection in that "[a] revolt goes beyond insurrection in aim,
being an attempt actually to overthrow the government itself, whereas insurrec-
tion has as its objective some forcible change within the government. A large-scale
revolt is called a rebellion and if it is successful it becomes a revolution." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1188 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
I-. Burns' Address, supra note 190, at 3. In the resolution initiating the Con-
vention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 10
I.L.M. 255 (1971), which was adopted by the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.) in 1971, the General Assembly of the O.A.S. stated that "(t]he political
and ideological pretexts utilized as justification for these crimes [acts of terrorism]
in no way mitigate their cruelty and irrationality or the ignoble nature of the
means employed, and in no way remove their character as acts in violation of
essential human rights." Resolution ofJune 30, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 1084 (1970).
"w See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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"9197
... [and] beyond the limits society thinks tolerable....
International terrorism has been described as "a strat-
egy of terror-inspiring violence containing an interna-
tional element and committed by individuals to produce
power outcomes."'' 98 According to some commentators,
terrorism becomes international in character and scope
"when it is (a) directed at foreigners or foreign targets, or
(b) concerted by the governments or factions of more
than one state, or (c) aimed at influencing the policies of a
foreign government or the international community."' 99
Others have defined international terrorism more broadly
as violent actions having global repercussions or lying be-
yond the accepted standards of war and diplomacy.20 °
Even the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Interna-
tional Terrorism, which met during July and August of
1973, was unable to formulate a satisfactory definition of
international terrorism. 20 1 As the United Nations General
,'37 Rapoport, supra note 192, at xvi-xvii.
,9 Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of International Ter-
rorism: An Introduction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 485 (A.E.
Evans &J.F. Murphy eds. 1978).
- Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 311.
2-0 B. JENKINS, supra note 186, at 10.
20, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). Some Third World nations, includ-
ing Algeria, Congo, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Nigeria, Southern Yemen, Syria,
Tanzania, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia, proposed the following
definition of "terrorism" that ultimately was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee:
(1) Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist
and alien regimes against peoples struggling for their liberation, for
their legitimate right to self-determination, independence and other
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(2) Tolerating or assisting by a State the organizations of the rem-
nants of fascists or mercenary groups whose terrorist activity is di-
rected against other sovereign countries;
(3) Acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of indi-
viduals which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize
fundamental freedoms. This should not affect the inalienable right
to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colo-
nial and racist rigimes and other forms of alien domination and the
legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national lib-
eration movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the
United Nations;
(4) Acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of indi-
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Assembly resolution that created the Ad Hoc Committee
on International Terrorism amply demonstrated, many
governments, especially those of the Arab, African and
Eastern European bloc nations, concern themselves more
with the legitimization of "wars of national liberation"
than with the suppression of terrorism. 20 2 Conversely,
most Western nations classify many national liberation
movements, particularly those engaged in "violence with
an international element designed to produce power out-
comes," as terrorist in nature. 0
With regard to terrorist attacks on diplomats, the
United States Department of State has said:
All terrorist attacks involve the use of violence for pur-
poses of political extortion, coercion, and publicity for a
political cause .... [A~ll attacks ... have one element in
common: All terrorist attacks are acts of political violence.
The terrorist is seeking to redress a political grievance,
overthrow a political system, or publicize a political point
of view.20 4
Although the State Department's analysis concerns terror-
ist attacks against diplomats, the proposed definition of
terrorism- contained therein applies with equal force to
terrorist attacks perpetrated against civilian targets. 20 5
Nevertheless, a senior Reagan Administration official re-
cently subscribed to a much broader doctrinal definition
of terrorism that classifies "hijacking aircraft, exploding
bombs in marketplaces and other public places, attacking
school buses and kindergartens, kidnapping businessmen,
and taking civilian hostages ... [as], objectively speaking,
terrorist acts, regardless of the ultimate political purposes
viduals for private gain, the effects of which are not confined to one
State.
Id. at 21.
=2 G.A. Res. 3034, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 119, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
-s See generally CONTROL OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ix-xiv (Y.
Alexander, M.A. Browne & A.S. Nanes eds. 1979).
2a, Perez, Terrorist Target: The Diplomat, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 24-25 (Aug. 1982).
2n Id
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of the perpetrators. 20 6 Although the Reagan Administra-
tion official justified this definitional approach by facilely
stating that " [t]here can never be ends so noble as to jus-
tify means such as these, ' 207 most commentators agree
that a political purpose motivates terrorism.0 8
Thus, by compiling the most widely accepted and criti-
cally objective definitional elements available,20 9 interna-
tional terrorism may be defined as terror-inspiring
violence 210 containing an international element 211 that is
committed by individuals21 2 or groups against non-com-
batants, civilians, states, or internationally protected per-
sons21 3 or entities214 in order to achieve political ends.2 15
Having delineated the elements that comprise terrorist
conduct, the first area of inquiry probes whether the War-
saw Convention's definition of "accident" covers terrorist
conduct.21 6 If, indeed, the Warsaw Convention does ap-
ply to terrorist incidents involving international air carri-
ers, then the second area of examination should be
whether an air carrier is subject to potentially unlimited
"2011 Bums' Address, supra note 190, at 3 (emphasis added).
207 Id.
"' See supra notes 198 and 204 and accompanying text. One analyst has stated
that terrorism is "the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction, or threats
of murder, injury, and destruction to realize a political end such as repression,
revolution, or a change in the policy of a regime ..... Wilkinson, supra note 188,
at 310 (emphasis added).
-' See supra notes 185-208 and accompanying text.
20 The phrase "terror-inspiring violence" comes from Bassiouni, supra note
198, at 485. It has been noted that this kind of violence, as opposed to the vio-
lence that results from force used by participants in a civil war or armed conflict, is
"inherently indiscriminate in its effect. This is partly a consequence of the nature
of much terrorist weaponry (bombs, land mines, etc.) and the frequent, deliberate
terrorist attacks on the civilian population and public facilities. But is it [sic] also
inherent in the objective of spreading terror." Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 310.
211 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
212 Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick has de-
scribed individuals engaged in terrorist activities as "the shock troops in a war to
the death against the values and institutions of a society and the people who em-
body it." Bums' Address, supra note 190, at 3.
"' See Perez, supra note 204, at 24-25.
2' See Bums' Address, supra note 190, at 3; see also supra note 195 and accompa-
nying text.
215 See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
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liability due to some form of willful misconduct on the
carrier's part that prompted the terrorist incident in
question. 7
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S
DEFINrrION OF "ACCIDENT" UNDER ARTICLE 17
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 21 8 predicates the
liability of an air carrier to its passengers upon the deter-
mination that an "accident occurred. '21 9 Unfortunately,
however, the Warsaw Convention does not explicitly de-
fine the term "accident." 220 The definition of "accident"
as an element of liability under article 17, therefore, has
been left to the determination of the courts.
A. The Absolute Liability Standard
After the air carriers' adoption of the Montreal Agree-
ment in 1961,221 a totally new system of absolute liability
emerged, 2  and the interpretation of the accident prereq-
uisite became increasingly significant.223 Courts rapidly
"'7 See infra notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
210 See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1404 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding
that the occurrence of an accident is a threshold requirement for liability under
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention); Lautore v. United Airlines, 16 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (case dismissed because plaintiff admitted there
had been no "accident" within the meaning of article 17).
Another precondition to liability established by article 17 requires that the
accident that caused the damage in dispute must have occurred on board the air-
craft or in the process of embarking or disembarking. See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 7, art. 17.
: Seesupra notes 87-117 and accompanying text. As a special contract between
air carriers pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Agreement incor-
porates all of the Convention's unamended provisions. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text; see also supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. Since the
Montreal Agreement did not amend article 17, the occurrence of an accident
under the Warsaw Convention remains a precondition to liability under the Mon-
treal Agreement as well. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
-3 See G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 109-10 (1977).
Since the adoption of the Montreal Agreement, the growing importance of deter-
mining conditions sufficient to hold air carriers liable has gained recognition
among commentators:
(The Montreal Agreement] changes the whole outlook of the liabil-
360 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
expanded the definition of "accident" to include terrorist
attacks 224 and airline hijackings2 25 based on a theory of ab-
solute liability of air carriers.226 Nevertheless, courts con-
tinued to avoid formulating a precise definition for the
term "accident" under both the Warsaw Convention and
the subsequent Montreal Agreement. 227
ity regime since the carriers that are party to it have agreed to raise
the liability limit to $75,000 and, more importantly.., to waive their
right to use Article 20(1) of the [Warsaw] Convention which allows
them to avoid liability if they prove that they had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to take such
measures. Thus, the carrier is in effect subject to a regime of strict
liability and it is essential to determine the conditions in which injury
or damage must occur before the carrier can be made responsible
for it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4 See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1977)
(en banc) (terrorist attack on airline passengers is an accident under article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir.
1975) (air carrier held liable under article 17 for terrorist attack on passengers
waiting to board aircraft), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) . But see In re Tel Aviv,
405 F. Supp. 154, 155 (D.P.R. 1975) (terrorist attack occurring in baggage claim
area not an accident under article 17), aff'd sub nom. Martinez Hernandez v. Air
France, 545 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1976).
22-. See Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 975
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (planned and deliberate hijackings of airliners are accidents
within meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention); Krystal v. British Over-
seas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (hijacking consti-
tutes an "accident" within meaning of Article 17); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport
Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (hijacking constitutes "accident"
under the Warsaw Convention), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973);
Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto, 74 III. 2d 90, 101, 383 N.E.2d 977,
980 (1978) (hijacking of airplane, and other acts of terrorism committed during
international flights, are accidents within the meaning of article 17), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 932 (1979).
22-, See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir. 1977). Although the liabil-
ity system of the Warsaw Convention is based on fault, air carriers, stripped of the
due care defense, are strictly liable for "accidents" under the Montreal Agree-
ment. See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258-59
(9th Cir.) (Montreal Agreement creates a system of absolute liability for air carri-
ers), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 37
(2d Cir. 1975) (absolute liability is imposed on air carriers under Montreal Agree-
ment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
227 See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter Husserl 1]. In
Husserl I, the court stated that "the Montreal Agreement seems to resolve
whatever doubt might have existed over the construction of the word 'accident'."
Id. at 706. The court reasoned that:
It is significant that press releases of the State Department and the
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Instead, courts frequently used policy considerations to
justify the imposition of an absolute liability standard
upon air carriers. Perceiving passenger protection as one
of the primary goals of the Warsaw Convention,228 courts
sought to determine what type of liability system would
best effectuate this policy objective. Impressed by the
possibility of unobstructed accident investigations and
swifter settlements, courts, therefore, began to utilize an
absolute liability standard based on the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Montreal Agreement in order to better pro-
tect passengers.229
B. Reappraising the Absolute Liability Standard
Application of the absolute liability standard, however,
created difficulties when courts confronted cases involv-
ing injuries230 occurring on routine international flights
not caused by abnormal events or circumstances. 31 In
order of the Civil Aeronautics Board do not mention the word "acci-
dent" in the context of recovering for personal injury, but rather
accept the proposition that the Montreal Agreement imposes a sys-
tem of "absolute liability" upon the carrier.
Id. (citations omitted).
Extending the reasoning of the Husserl I court, the courts in the terrorist attack
cases again skirted the "accident" question by focusing instead on the issue of
embarkation and disembarkation. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
- See Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that
passenger protection is one of the principle goals of the Warsaw Convention), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
220 16t
2-0 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention permits recovery for "wounding" or
"bodily injury." See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The issue that typically
arises in cases of terrorist incidents involving international air carriers is whether
article 17 provides recovery for mental distress absent some physical injury or
manifestation. See, e.g., Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp.
1322, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (recovery for emotional distress allowed under Mon-
treal Agreement); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (damages for mental distress recoverable under both the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement) [hereinafter Husserl H]. But see Burnett
v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973) (recovery for
mental anguish not permitted under the Warsaw Convention); Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, -, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857 (1974) (Warsaw Conven-
tion does not allow recovery for psychological trauma in and of itsel). See generally
Recovey for Mental Harm Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: An Interpretation of
L6sion Corporelle, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp'. L. REv. 339 (1985).
21 See infra notes 232-259 and accompanying text.
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Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines,23 2 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania be-
came the first court to examine this issue.2 3 The plaintiff
in that case was a passenger who sought to recover dam-
ages for permanent hearing loss that was triggered by the
routine repressurization of the cabin of the jet aircraft in
question as it descended from a high altitude to land. 34
The court, after noting that all previous courts defined ac-
cidents as unusual and unanticipated events proximately
causing injury, 23 5 ruled that an injury arising "from ordi-
nary, anticipated and required programmed changes in
the aircraft's operation, all of which were performed pur-
posefully under the careful control of the plane's crew in
the normal and prudent course of flight control is not [an
accident]. ' 23 6 Thus, the court held that an abnormal hap-
pening23 7 was the appropriate standard for determining
whether an "accident" occurred.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Reacceptance of the Absolute
Liability Standard
In Saks v. Air France,238 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to disregard the ab-
normal occurrence standard proposed by the Court in
Warshaw for determining when an accident has oc-
curred.239 In Saks, a passenger on an international flight
suffered a permanent hearing loss in her left ear allegedly
due to normal cabin pressurization changes during the
landing of an aircraft operated by the defendant airline,
Air France. 240 The district court, relying on the unusual
2.- 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
2" Id. at 401-05.
-- Id.
23.1 Id. at 410 (the court distinguished MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402
(1st Cir. 1971) based on the lack of external factors that could have induced the
injury in question).
2.1, Id. at 413.
2.4 Id.
2- 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
2... Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 413.
2411 Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
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or abnormal occurrence standard,24' found that nothing
unexpected or unusual had affected the aircraft's depres-
surization system. Thus, the district court held that Air
France was not liable for damages because no accident
had occurred within the meaning of article 17 of the War-
saw Convention.242
The Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected the ab-
normal occurrence standard adopted by the district court
for determining when an accident has taken place.243 In-
stead, the court of appeals held that the Montreal Agree-
ment creates a shift from a negligence to an absolute
liability standard for all injuries proximately caused by
events occurring during air travel. 44 Under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's absolute liability standard, therefore, the scope of
the article 17 "accident" includes injuries resulting from
any incident connected with normal aircraft operations.245
D. The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Absolute
Liability Standard
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's absolute liability standard for determining the
scope of the term "accident" under both the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement.2 46 The Court
began its opinion by differentiating between the cause
and effect of an injury,247 stressing that "it is the cause of
the injury that must satisfy the definition [of the term 'ac-
cident'] rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. ' 248
"41 d The district court relied on two cases out of the Third Circuit as judicial
support for the unusual or abnormal occurrence standard. See DeMarines v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978); Warshaw v. Trans World
Airlines, 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
242 Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
243 Id.
"4 See id. at 1386-87.
2,5 See idL at 1384-88.
241 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
4, Id at 399. The Court noted that "American jurisprudence has long recog-
nized this distinction between an accident that is the cause of an injury and an
injury that is itself an accident." Id. (emphasis in original).
-1 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Thus, in order to hold an air carrier liable for passenger
injuries under article 17, the Court stated that "the pas-
senger [must] be able to prove that some link in the chain
[of causes to the injury] was an unusual or unexpected
event external to the passenger. "249
The Supreme Court supported the unusual or unex-
pected occurrence standard for defining the term "acci-
dent" by finding that the Montreal Agreement did not
establish absolute liability for air carriers.250 The Court
initially held that the Montreal Agreement expands air
carrier liability by requiring airlines to waive the right to
defend claims on the grounds that all necessary and possi-
ble measures were taken to avoid the passenger's in-
jury. 25' Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the
Montreal Agreement does not impose absolute liability on
air carriers.25 2 Rather, the Court stated that "[u]nder the
Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment, liability can ... be viewed as 'absolute' only in the
sense that an airline cannot defend a claim on the ground
that it took all necessary measures to avoid the injury. "253
Thus, because of the Supreme Court's holding in Air
France v. Saks that an air carrier is liable "only if a passen-
ger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger,125 4 the fact
that the intentional acts of third parties rather than the
carrier caused the injury in question will not preclude air
carrier liability.2 55 Although it did not specifically address
"1 Id. at 406.
_rA, Id. at 406-407. The Court found that the characterization of the Montreal
Agreement as imposing absolute liability on air carriers "is not entirely accurate"
because specific provisions of the Warsaw Convention that "operate to qualify [air
carrier] liability, such as the contributory negligence defense of Article 21 or the
'accident' requirement of Article 17," were not waived by the parties to the Mon-
treal Agreement. Id. at 407.




See, e.g., Husserl 1, 351 F. Supp. at 707 ("the innocent victims of willful acts by
[third parties) are to be able to recover from the carrier, even in respect to acts of
sabotage to the aircraft ... [I]t was the final intent of the parties [to the Montreal
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the issue of air carrier liability for the intentional acts of
third parties, the Court stated that the unusual or unex-
pected happening standard for determining whether an
accident occurred "should be flexibly applied after assess-
ment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's
injuries. .. . For example, lower courts in this country
have interpreted Article 17 broadly enough to encompass
torts committed by terrorists or fellow passengers. ' 2 56
Based on the unusual or unexpected occurrence standard
adopted by the Supreme Court,257 therefore, passenger
injuries caused by international terrorist incidents perpe-
trated by third parties and unrelated to the normal opera-
tion of international commercial air carriage fall within
the term "accident" under both the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Agreement. Thus, terrorist incidents
may subject an air carrier to liability of up to $75,000 per
passenger2 58 unless "willful misconduct" on the part of
the carrier can be shown.259
V. THE WILLFUL MISCONDUCT EXCEPTION
A. Defining "Willful Misconduct"
The Warsaw Convention's "willful misconduct" excep-
tion, which was preserved by the Montreal Agreement,260
provides for unlimited damages if the plaintiff can prove
the air carrier's willful misconduct.26' Thus, in order to
recover more than the $75,000 liability limit allowed
Agreement] to render the carriers liable to the innocent victims of such inten-
tional acts [by third parties]."); see also Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 396 F.
Supp. 95, 100 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (Montreal Agreement did not attempt to limit ap-
plication of the term "accident" to exclude the criminal acts of third parties), rev 'd
on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
25, Saks, 470 U.S. at 405 (citations omitted); see supra notes 224-225 and accom-
panying text.
2 See supra notes 246-254 and accompaning text.
'-" See generally supra notes 87-114 and accompanying text discussing the Mon-
treal Agreement.
-9 See generally supra notes 50-51 and notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
2'" See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
"m See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 25; see also supra note 50.
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under the Montreal Agreement, 26 2 the plaintiff must show
that the accident263 in question was proximately caused by
the willful misconduct of either the air carrier, its agents
or employees. 2
Although article 25 of the Warsaw Convention does not
define "willful misconduct, ' 265 several courts have at-
tempted to formulate a workable definition of the willful
misconduct exception. For example, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has
defined willful misconduct as "the willful performance of
an act that is likely to result in damage or willful action
with a reckless disregard of the probable conse-
quences. 2 66  In addition, some courts have required
proof of actual prior knowledge before imposing liability
for willful misconduct.2 67 A finding of willful misconduct
on the part of an air carrier, which is a prerequisite for
" See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
2-0' For a discussion involving the definition of the term "accident," see supra
notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
2-16 Wing Hang Bank v. Japan Air Lines, 357 F. Supp. 94, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(no "willful misconduct" exists when airline's valuable freight storage area, from
which a package shipped on an international flight was stolen, was guarded, moni-
tored by closed circuit television cameras, and was robbed only once during previ-
ous year).
2,:7 See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 536
(2d Cir. 1965) (willful misconduct requires knowledge that damage probably
would occur); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, 187 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir.)
("[w]illful misconduct in the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that
the performance of that act will probably result in injury or damage, or it may be
the intentional performance of an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disre-
gard of the probable consequences ... [or] the intentional omission of some act,
with knowledge that such omission will probably result in damage or injury, or the
intentional omission of some act in a manner from which could be implied reck-
less disregard of the probable consequences of the omission") (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Air-
lines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 240 (N.D. I1. 1983) (willful misconduct exists when "an
act or omission is taken with knowledge that the act probably will result in injury
or damage or with reckless disregard of the probable consequences"); Saaybe v.
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 F. Supp. 65, 69 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (willful misconduct
indicates the desire to cause the obtained result, or the knowledge that such result
was substantially likely to occur); see also Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282,
285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); American Airlines v. Ulen,
186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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awarding unlimited liability, 268 therefore, remains a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by a jury that employs the
definition or standard of "willful misconduct" prevailing
in the jurisdiction of the forum court.269
The Warsaw Convention, however, excuses an air car-
rier from liability if it is proven that "all necessary meas-
ures" were taken to avoid the accident or that it was
impossible to take such measures." 0 Nevertheless, most
air carriers agreed to waive the "due care" defense with
the Montreal Agreement. 27 1 For example, air carriers
signing the Montreal Agreement agreed that they were
best able to develop preventive security precautions for
controlling access to aircraft, most qualified to assess and
prevent aviation risks and most able to distribute the costs
of preventing airline injuries.27 2 Thus, in order to avoid
potential unlimited liability for willful misconduct, air car-
riers must ensure through every available means that ter-
rorists and hijackers are not able to succeed in placing
either weapons or explosives aboard any aircraft sched-
uled for international flight.
B. Protection Against the Potential Unlimited Liability of Air
Carriers Through Increased Security Precautions
When the frequency of airline hijackings first began to
rise in 1968,273 the United States government organized a
task force to develop a system designed to detect poten-
tial hijackers without requiring a complete search of each
passenger.274 The task force suggested using two proce-
• ... See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
-, See, e.g., Maschinenfabrik, 562 F. Supp. at 240.
-" Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 20, para. 1. The "due care" defense
of article 20 provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible for him or them to take such measures." Id.; see also supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
•I See Husserl I, 351 F. Supp. at 703 n.l.
.72 Id at 707.
273 See A. EVANS &J. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 5
(1978) [hereinafter A. EVANS &J. MURPHY].
274 A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw, ch. 8, § 2.32 (2d ed. 1981).
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dures to detect potential hijackers and terrorists: person-
ality analysis and metal detection.27 5 The personality
analysis, or "hijacker profile," 276 developed by a team of
psychologists and federal investigators 2 7 7 is still an im-
portant preliminary screening device at many airports.278
The metal detector,279 however, remains the primary sys-
tem for screening persons for weapons since its installa-
tion at airport departure gates became mandatory in all
United States airports in 1973.280
In response to the increased terrorist threat to air carri-
ers following the United States bombing of Libya in
1986,81 United States air carriers and airports began im-
plementing new and more stringent security measures
that included initiating passenger body searches, 8 2 in-
creasing armed guards,283  ordering additional x-ray284
275 Id.
2- The "hijacker profile" is a personality sketch of potential airline hijackers
that contains about twenty-five behavioral characteristics that previous hijackers
tended to demonstrate. See Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates,
18 VILL. L. REv. 1004 (1973). The federal government has-kept the specific char-
acteristics included in the "hijacker profile" confidential for security reasons. See
also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
77 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 274, ch. 8, § 2.32.
"- Terrorist Hjach Spurs U.S. Review of Int ' Security, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June
24, 1985, at 32.
'71 A metal detector is a device typically attached to two standing poles through
which prospective passengers walk. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182
(3d Cir. 1972). A metal detector registers positive readings whenever an amount
of ferrous metal equivalent to that contained in a small handgun is carried
through the device. Id.
'-" Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972 (command-
ing the mandatory use of passenger screening devices by January 5, 1973) (re-
printed in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 902 n.25 (9th Cir. 1973)).
"' See FAA Tightens Airport Security, supra note 5, at 31; Hersh, Target Qaddafy,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 17; see also supra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
"' FAA Tightens Airport Security, supra note 5, at 31.
2- After the 1986 U.S. bombing raid on Libya, heavily armed FAA police wear-
ing body armor were put on patrol at Washington's Dulles International Airport.
Id. at 32. Officials at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, on the
other hand, refused to post heavily armed police and armored vehicles outside the
airport terminal, a security technique much in evidence at European airports in
recent years. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Terrorism (PBS television broadcast,
May 26, 1986) (Transcript No. 2781 available on NEXIS). As Henry De Geneste,
who oversees the police force at JKF International, stated: "[The] concern is if
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and hand-examination of luggage, and holding cargo in
certain cases for a minimum twenty-four hour period in
advance of flight.285 Nevertheless, standard security meas-
ures continue to remain vulnerable to a new generation of
plastic weapons, such as plastic guns and plastic
explosives.286
American Science and Engineering, a Boston-based
company that manufactures x-ray machines, has devel-
oped a new machine, called the Model Z, that will help
combat the threat of plastic weapons.287 The Model Z is
able to detect plastic, as well as metal, and also can detect
plastic explosives where standard machines cannot.288
Although several foreign airlines and governments al-
ready have purchased the machine, no United States air-
line had done so as late as May 1986.289
In addition, the FAA recently announced plans to test
an advanced detection system designed to prevent bombs
or other explosive devices from being loaded into the
cargo holds of airplanes.290 Successful deployment of this
new detection instrument would provide automatic dis-
covery of weapons and explosive materials, and virtually
100 percent screening of all baggage and freight being
you have your people visible with heavy armament, the would-be ... terrorist ....
when he surveils an airport and looks to see where your police people are
deployed. ... knows then... [Instead,] we keep our people (atJFK International]
in patrol cars patrolling the airport." Id.
284 FAA Tightens Airport Security, supra note 5, at 31. As of May 1986, JFK Interna-
tional was using the only x-ray van in the United States. The MacNeil/Lehrer New-
sHour: Terrorism (PBS television broadcast, May 26, 1986) (Transcript No. 2781
available on NEXIS). The x-ray van used atJFK International is a device that can
be wheeled into the cargo bay of any airline in order to x-ray suspicious baggage
bound for the cargo hold of an aircraft. Id
FAA Tightens Airport Security, supra note 5, at 31.
"' The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Terrorism (PBS television broadcast, May 26,
1986) (Transcript No. 2781 available on NEXIS).
2147 /d.
"'2 Id
"-" U.S. Hill Test Bomb Detector For Air Cargo, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, at I, col.
5; see New Security Measures Sought in Wake of Hyjachings, Bombings, Associated Press,
July 29, 1985 (available on NEXIS).
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placed aboard aircraft.29 1 Another explosives detector
still in development, that bases its detection capability on
an analysis of vapors from the objects being searched,
eventually may be used to screen people and carry-on
baggage at airport boarding gates.292 Thermedics, Inc.,
the company that is developing this particular vapor-de-
tection equipment, claims that the prototype analyzers
''are capable of detecting not only dynamite but also TNT
and the previously undetectable plastic explosives, PETN
and RDX."' 293 Thus, international air carriers, and airport
authorities as well, soon will be able to use additional and
more technologically sophisticated detection devices to
thwart potential terrorist incidents.
Until this new generation of technology is made widely
available, however, air carriers still may employ more
traditional and proven security measures in order to ac-
tively prevent terrorist occurrences, and therefore, to
avoid the possibility of unlimited liability that accompa-
nies the willful misconduct of an air carrier whenever af-
firmative steps are not taken to stop potential terrorist
incidents. For example, in order to minimize the risk of
terrorist attack, air carriers could require that luggage can
be checked in for a flight only by ticketed passengers at
the air carrier's ticket counter.294 This would eliminate the
possibility of a terrorist driving up to the entrance of an
2W New Security Measures Sought in Wake of Hijackings, Bombings, Associated Press,
July 29, 1985 (available on NEXIS). The heart of this new system is a detection
chamber, able to examine each item of luggage or cargo in six seconds, that oper-
ates by bombarding the items to be examined with streams of slowed neutrons.
U.S. Will Test Bomb Detector For Air Cargo, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
This process makes it possible to detect the presence of nitrogen, which is a com-
ponent of all known explosives. Id. This detection process is known as "thermal
neutron activation." Id. at 13, col. 2.
'-!,2 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, at 13, col. 1. This vapor-detection system oper-
ates by picking up vapors from objects and people. Id. at 13, cols. 2-3. The detec-
tion equipment then identifies the specific chemicals producing the vapors. Id. at
13, col. 2.
Id. at 13, col. 3.
Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 67-85,June 27, 1985 (statement
of U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole) [hereinafter DOT Press Re-
lease No. 67-85) (available from Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Af-
fairs, Washington, D.C.).
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air terminal, checking bomb-laden luggage aboard a flight
and then driving away.295
Air carriers and airport authorities also must ensure
that airline personnel are individually screened before be-
ing allowed access to any aircraft. 96 In addition, air carri-
ers should subject security personnel to intense scrutiny
in order to ensure that their duties are being performed
effectively.297 An airline executive once concluded that
"terrorists have demonstrated that they will do what they
want, when they want, no matter what is done. ' 298 Fortu-
nately, statistics show that as airport and air carrier secur-
ity has tightened and become increasingly more vigorous
in the decades since the late 1960s, there has been a cor-
responding decrease in the number of successful hijack-
ings per year.299 Thus, air carriers have performed their
2- In response to this possibility, the United States eliminated curbside check-
in for luggage on international flights following the hijacking of a TWA jet to
Beirut in June 1985. See U.S. Will Test Bomb Detector For Air Cargo, N.Y. Times, Apr.
18, 1987, at 13, col. 1; see also DOT Press Release No. 67-85, supra note 294. The
U.S. government also declared that only ticketed passengers with positive identifi-
cation would be able to check-in luggage at airline ticket counters. DOT Press
Release No. 67-85, supra note 294.
Due to the fact that many airports experience a labor turnover rate that can
be as high as 200 percent annually, background investigation of new personnel
may not be conducted thoroughly. Sixty Minutes: Airport (CBS television broadcast,
Dec. 1, 1985). In order to counteract this problem, the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA) of air carriers has suggested that all cleaning, catering
and other personnel at airports be searched by some method before gaining ac-
cess to the airport tarmac to perform their duties. IATA Experts Focus on Airport
Ramp Security, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 2, 1985, at 31.
207 See Better Technology or Better Technicians?, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1985, at 13,
col. 1.
22 Skrzycki, Can We Secure the World's Skies?, 99 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,July 8,
1985, at 32.
Although almost ninety hijackings occurred each year in 1969 and 1970, the
overall number of hijackings decreased into the sixties in both 1971 and 1972. A.
EvANs & J. MURPHY, supra note 273, at 5. As airports and air carriers began to
institute tighter and more effective security measures, the number of airline
hijackings occurring per year continued to drop into the twenties from 1973
through 1977. Id. Since 1978, the number of airline hijackings has remained at a
rate of less than thirty-five per year. Making the Sky Secure, TIME,July 1, 1985, at 21.
Terrorist incidents increased in the mid-1980s, however, due in large part to a
decrease in vigilance in implementing aviation security programs. See Kotaite, Se-
curity of Int'l Civil Aviation - Role of ICAO, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 95, 96
(1982).
372 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
affirmative duty to passengers by developing and follow-
ing any number of strict security measures that help pre-
vent terrorist attacks. If an air carrier's security
precautions are found to be inadequate, however, the air
carrier may be found guilty of willful misconduct, and
therefore, subject to potential unlimited liability for pas-
senger injuries caused by terrorist attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention and its progeny often prevent
victims of terrorism from adequately recovering for their
injuries. Although various revisions have been proposed
but never ratified by the United States, the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that the Warsaw Convention,
with its limitation on liability, continues to remain applica-
ble in the United States for typical international air acci-
dent litigation cases. Under the Montreal Agreement,
however, international air carriers independently agreed
to raise the $8,300 liability limit of the Warsaw Conven-
tion to $75,000 per passenger for death or injury occur-
ring on international flights, a liability limit still in force to
date. Yet, under the Warsaw Convention, air carriers face
the possibility of unlimited liability if an injured plaintiff
can prove that the accident in question occurred as a re-
sult of the air carrier's willful misconduct.
In order to determine whether or not the Warsaw Con-
vention covers terrorist occurrences, it is necessary first to
determine the nature and scope of terrorism itself. While
no universal legal definition of terrorism exists, by com-
piling the most widely accepted and critically objective
definitional elements available, it is possible to define in-
ternational terrorism as terror-inspiring violence contain-
ing an international element that is committed by
individuals or groups against non-combatants, civilians,
states, or internationally protected persons or entities in
order to achieve political ends.
Based on this definition of terrorism, it becomes neces-
sary to determine whether terrorist activity falls within the
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meaning of the "accident" predicate to liability under ar-
ticle 17 of the Warsaw Convention. While the Warsaw
Convention does not explicitly define the term "acci-
dent," the Supreme Court has held that an injured pas-
senger must prove that an unusual or unexpected event
external to the passenger in some way caused the injury in
question in order to recover. Thus, terrorist incidents fall
within the article 17 definition of the term "accident," and
therefore, are covered by the Convention.
In order to exceed the Montreal Agreement's $75,000
per passenger liability limitation, however, an injured pas-
senger has the burden of proving that the air carrier's
willful misconduct in some way contributed to or caused
the injury in question. Generally, in order to prove willful
misconduct, the passenger must show that the air carrier
acted or failed to act, knowing that to do so would or
could lead to injury or damage, with reckless disregard of
the probable consequences. Nevertheless, a finding of
willful misconduct on the part of an air carrier, which is a
prerequisite to imposing unlimited liability, remains a
question to be determined by a jury using the definition
or standard of "willful misconduct" prevailing in the juris-
diction of the forum court.
Under the Warsaw Convention, however, if an air car-
rier proves that "all necessary measures" were taken to
avoid the accident or that it was impossible to take such
measures, an air carrier is excused from unlimited liabil-
ity. Thus, in order to avoid potential unlimited liability
for willful misconduct, air carriers must ensure through
every available means that would-be terrorists and hijack-
ers are not able to evade airline or airport security
precautions.
Thus, in order to protect airline passengers from the
horrors of terrorist attack, air carriers and airport authori-
ties must work together to strengthen and to increase se-
curity precautions both in the air and on the ground.
History has shown, however, that without either govern-
mental or monetary incentives, air carriers too often have
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neglected to provide security measures that could prevent
terrorist incidents from occurring. Yet, through the will-
ful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention, air
carriers face the possibility of unlimited liability for failure
to implement proper preventative precautions against
terrorists.
Courts, therefore, should broadly construe the willful
misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention in order
to find unlimited liability for passenger injuries whenever
air carrier security precautions are lacking. In this way,
the courts can help ensure air carrier safety and preven-
tion against terrorist attack. Since the airline industry is
no longer a fledgling, and since airlines are routinely sub-
jected to unlimited liability in United States domestic air
crash litigation, there is no longer any need to protect air-
lines from potentially debilitating lawsuits. Broad con-
struction of the willful misconduct provision of the
Warsaw Convention would provide substantial recovery
to those injured passengers in immediate need. More-
over, air carriers still would be held responsible for acts of
willful misconduct. Air carriers, therefore, would have an
incentive to increase, improve and maintain security pre-
cautions designed to thwart potential terrorist attacks.
Because the airline industry is no longer nascent and no
longer in need of protection, there now is a need for a
uniform standard of air carrier liability on international
flights that will protect the innocent and injured United
States air traveling public.
